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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 77-35-26, Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended, as this is an appeal from 
the final Judgment and Order of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in a criminal matter. Jurisdiction is appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court denying the Appellant!s Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea, and sentencing the Defendant to serve a 
term not less than one year, and not more than 15 years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On June 28th, 1988 Appellant appeared in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court for a continued arraignment and entered a 
plea of guilty to an information charging him with Sexual Abuse 
of a Child, a 2nd Degree Felony. No record was made of said 
proceeding. On the 30th day of August, 1988, Appellant was 
sentenced to a one to fifteen year term in the Utah State Prison. 
On September 29, 1988, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. Appellant made a Motion to the Court 
of Appeals to remand the case to the Seventh Judicial District 
Court for the purpose of filing a Motion to Withdraw his Guilty 
Plea. On the 27th day of March, 1989, the Court of Appeals 
granted Appellant's Motion to Remand to the District Court. On 
June 6, 1989, the District Court heard and denied Appellant's 
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea. The case was then returned 
to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant appeared initially for arraigned on March 29, 
1988, and at that time Mr. Allen Thorpe was appearing for Mr. 
John Bucher, Mr. HeinigerTs attorney of record. Mr. Heiniger 
entered a plea of not guilty to an information charging him with 
Rape of a Child, a first degree felony. The matter was set for 
trial on the 8th day of June, 1988. 
On June 1, 1988, this matter was again discussed during the 
District Court's Law and Motion Calendar, although the matter was 
not scheduled on said calendar, at which time Mr. Bucher advised 
the Court that the Appellant was going to enter a plea of guilty, 
and that the trial previously set for June 8th, 1988, should be 
vacated. Even though the Appellant was not present during said 
discussion or hearing, the District Court vacated the trial date, 
on Counsel for the Defendant's representation, and set the matter 
for disposition at the Court's regularly scheduled Law and Motion 
Day for June 28, 1988. 
On June 28th, 1988, the Defendant's case was called during 
the Law and Motion Calendar. On said day, the Defendant was 
represented by Ray Stoddard, an associate of Mr. Bucher. At that 
time, the Court recessed, to allow Counsel to discuss the case, 
and attempt to resolve the matter. At that time the Prosecutor, 
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Mr. Stoddard and Defendant discussed the case and the Court's 
anticipation of a guilty plea. Eventually, Defendant understood 
that the State would recommend probation if he entered his plea 
to a second degree felony, sexual abuse of a child, instead of 
the original charge of Rape of a Child. The parties returned to 
the courtroom, but no record was made of the remaining part of 
the proceeding as the Court Reporter was not called back into the 
courtroom when the other parties returned. The defendant 
reluctantly entered his guilty plea, but indicated to his counsel 
and to the prosecutor that he desired to have Mr. Bucher present, 
rather than Mr. Bucher's associate. 
After the proceeding, Mr. Stoddard presented a "Statement of 
Defendant" to the Defendant, and instructed him to sign it. 
Counsel did not read the statement to the Defendant, nor did he 
explain its contents to the Defendant, but merely indicated that 
Defendant was required to sign it. Defendant signed it, upon 
counsel's instruction, without knowing or understanding its 
contents. 
On the 9th day of September, 1989, Defendant appeared in 
District Court for sentencing. Defendant was not granted 
probation but was sentenced to serve a one to fifteen year term 
in the Utah State Prison. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(a) Whether the District Court committed error in allowing 
the proceeding to take place without the Court Reporter present 
to record the happenings of the proceeding. 
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(b) Whether the District Court committed error in accepting 
the Defendant's plea of guilty without establishing on the record 
the Defendants understanding of his various constitutional 
rights . 
(c) Whether the District Court committed error when it 
denied Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
(d) Whether the District Court was justified in making its 
finding that the Appellant had voluntarily entered his plea of 
guilty from the record made during the hearing on Appellant's 
Motion to withdraw his plea. 
(e) Whether the District Court was justified in making its 
finding that the Appellant had not raised a legal reason to state 
why sentencing should not be carried out at the time of his 
sentencing . 
(f) Whether the Court was justified in relying on the 
Appellant's written Statement of Defendant in determining the 
Appellant was fully aware of his constitutional rights with 
respect to entry of a guilty plea, particularly when the 
Appellant testified that the Statement was signed after the 
hearing, without having been read by the Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant contends that the plea of guilty, entered by 
him on June 28, 1988, was not entered voluntarily, and that he 
was not satisfied with his counsel at the time said plea was 
entered. Appellant complains that his retained counsel was not 
present at that time to represent him, and that he raised this 
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question to both the prosecutor and to the attorney sent by his 
counsel to appear for counsel at the hearing to receive the plea. 
Appellant further contends that the Court failed to make a 
proper record establishing the voluntary and knowing nature of 
the plea of guilty by the Appellant and that it should not have 
been accepted. The Court did not adequately establish on the 
record, as required by statute, that the plea was properly made 
and accepted. 
Appellant argues that the Court should not have denied his 
Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea. The court's reliance upon 
the written statement of the defendant was improper, particularly 
when the Appellant testified at the hearing on the matter that 
the written plea was not read to or by him, and that he signed it 
only upon instruction of Mr. Bucherfs associate. There is no 
evidence to support the contents of the written Statement, and 
the Court established no record indicating the Appellant 
understood the contents of the Statement of Defendant. 
Appellant contends that the District Court's finding that 
the record shows no evidence of the Defendant having been 
dissatisfied with his attorney, that the plea was entered with 
counsel present, and that the Statement of Defendant was proper 
are all unsupported by the record of and in the case and are 
directly contrary to the only record available in the matter. 
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ARGUMENT I 
RULE 3.6 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND 
CIRCUIT COURTS, AND RULE 11, CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, UCA, (1953) AS AMENDED, REQUIRES THAT THE 
COURT SHALL NOT ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT FIRST 
MAKING CERTAIN THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTANDS HIS OR HER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENTRY OF SAID 
PLEA. IF THE COURT FAILS TO MAKE SAID FINDING THE PLEA 
OF GUILTY SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Section 17, Article 
VIII, provides that the District Court shall be a "Court of 
Record." This provision clearly requires that the actions of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court be recorded in an appropriate and 
acceptable manner. The record is to be made at each proceeding 
of the District Court. There should be no question that the 
absence of a Court Reporter in the Seventh Judicial District 
court room to record the actions of the Court on the 28th day of 
June, 1988, during the time the Appellant entered a plea of 
guilty to a second degree felony was improper. In essence, 
acting off the record, whether intentionally or inadvertently, 
the District Court failed to comply with the provision of the 
Utah Constitution. 
This failure becomes even more acute in conjunction with 
Rule 11, Code of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) 
as Amended, 77-35-11, and Rule 3.6 the Rules of Practice for the 
District and Circuit Courts, both of which require that the 
defendant be aware of, and understand, the nature of the charge 
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against him, the minimum and maximum sentence, the right of 
defendant to enter a plea of not guilty, the right of a trial by 
jury, the right to confront witnesses against the defendant, the 
right against self incrimination, and the right to appeal a 
conviction. The rules of practice require that these findings be 
made, and the constitution requires that said findings be 
supported by the record. In State vs. Turner, (1969) 22 U.2d 
294, 452 P.2d 323, the Supreme Court of Utah indicated that for a 
plea of guilty to be valid it must appear that the accused had a 
clear understanding of the charge and voluntarily entered such 
plea without undue coercion or improper influence. As is stated, 
it cannot so appear, in this matter, because no record was 
created. The Seventh District Court attempts to correct its 
mistake at the hearing on Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his 
Guilty Plea, but at that time, the only evidence presented it 
that the Appellant did not understand his legal and 
constitutional rights with regard to the guilty plea. 
Nevertheless, the District Court stated that it found from the 
record (or lack thereof) that the Appellant was fully aware of 
said rights. Notwithstanding the Appellant's testimony regarding 
the o-nly record which existed, that being the written Statement 
of Defendant, the District Court found from a non-existent record 
that there was no evidence that Appellant's rights weren't fully 
enforced. The District Court reverses the obligation and 
responsibility outlined in Rules 11 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and Rule 3.6 of the Rules of Procedure of the District 
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Court. It is the Court's affirmative duty to see that the 
defendant understands the various rights, not the defendant's 
obligation to show he doesn't understand them. 
The rules require that if the court fails to make the 
required finding of the above elements the court shall not accept 
a plea of guilty. In this case, the Court failed to make a 
finding on the record establishing the Defendant was aware of his 
legal and constitutional rights and that he was knowingly and 
voluntarily waiving same. No finding was made that the defendant 
was satisfied or dissatisfied with his counsel or that he 
understood the terms and statements contained in the Statement of 
Defendant. The District Court's Order on these issues states 
that the record shows no evidence of the Defendant having been 
dissatisfied with counsel or that Appellant did not understand 
his legal and constitutional rights. The District Court places 
the burden of providing a record on the Appellant when it is the 
District Court who has the responsibility of creating a proper 
record of its transactions. 
Without a record to show the Appellant adequately understood 
his rights as to the entry of a guilty plea, the plea should be 
set aside or withdrawn. 
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ARGUMENT II 
WHILE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT CAN BE USED IN 
ESTABLISHING THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY ADVISED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO ENTERING A GUILTY 
PLEA AND ESTABLISHING THE ENTRY OF SUCH A PLEA WAS 
VOLUNTARY, SUCH WRITTEN STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO REPLACE THE COURT'S OWN INTERROGATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT TO MAKE CERTAIN THE CONTENTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN STATEMENT ARE TRUE AND CORRECT 
In Lindeman vs. Morris (1982) 641 P.2d 133 the Supreme Court 
indicated that a written affidavit executed by the defendant in 
the presence of the Court could be relied on to help establish 
the voluntary nature of the defendant's plea of guilty. See also 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969). At that time, however, the court required that the 
defendant sign the affidavit in open court. In this matter, 
there is a "Statement of Defendant," but there is nothing to 
indicate it was signed in the presence of the Court. To the 
contrary, the Appellant testified at the hearing to withdraw his 
plea of guilty that counsel gave him the statement on his way out 
of the courthouse, not just the courtroom, and told him he had to 
sign the document. The Appellant further testified that he did 
not read the document, nor did counsel read it to him. The 
Appellant testified that he did not know the contents of the 
statement, only that he was told to sign it. 
Such a statement falls far short of the requirements of Rule 
11 and 3.6, cited above. In State vs. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987) the Court of Appeals stated that while the statement 
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of defendant form is useful in helping to establish the requisite 
elements of a guilty plea, it is not entirely sufficient. The 
Court stated, "The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote 
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the starting point." 
In providing further instruction on the proper use of the 
affidavit, the Court provided: 
The trial judge should then review the statements in 
the affidavit with the defendant, question the 
defendant concerning his understanding of it, and 
fulfill the other requirement imposed by section 77-35-
11 on the record before accepting the guilty plea. 
In Gibbons, the Court quoted from McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459 (1969): 
(B)ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all of the 
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be 
truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.... 
...The judge must determine "that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense included 
therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty... 
...There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in 
the record, at the time the plea in entered the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge 
against him. Id. at 466, 467, and 470 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court failed to review the contents 
of the Statement of Defendant on the record. From the 
uncontroverted testimony of the Appellant, there was no Statement 
of Defendant at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty. If 
there was no Statement of Defendant at the hearing in which 
Appellant entered his plea then there is nothing at all to 
establish the defendant was aware of his legal and constitutional 
rights. Even if the Statement of Defendant had been executed in 
open court it would not have been sufficient to comply with the 
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requirements of Rule 11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended, 
77-35-11. Clearly, more is required. 
The District Court could have used the hearing to Withdraw 
the Guilty Plea, for which the Court of Appeals had remanded the 
case, to provide the review of the Defendant's Statement. The 
Court did not interrogate the Appellant, and Appellant testified 
as to his lack of understanding of the document and the other 
aspects of his guilty plea. The judge then attempted to justify 
the lack of record, ruling the record did not contain evidence of 
a lack of understanding. The record, prior to the Motion to 
Withdraw Plea, contained nothing whatsoever regarding the entry 
of the guilty plea. Had the District Court have reviewed the 
statement, it would have been told that there was no 
understanding of same, and the only finding possible would have 
been that the Appellant did not enter the plea voluntarily or 
knowingly, or otherwise as required by Rule 11 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT ENTERED HIS PLEA VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY, 
WHEN THE DEFENDANT TESTIFIED AT HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
THE GUILTY PLEA THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HIS LEGAL 
RIGHTS, WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE REPRESENTATION OF 
HIS COUNSEL, DID NOT VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY, AND DID NOT READ, NOR DID HIS COUNSEL READ TO 
HIM, THE CONTENTS OF THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT 
The Appellant testified at the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty 
Plea that the Statement of Defendant was signed by him after the 
hearing at which he entered a plea of guilty. He testified that 
he was not satisfied with his counsel, and that he had indicated 
to the prosecutor and his counsel that he desired John Bucher, 
the attorney he had retained, be present to assist him. He 
testified that he entered the plea of guilty because he was told 
he would get probation rather than a prison term. 
Notwithstanding, the Court entered its order that there was no 
evidence on the record that the Defendant/Appellant did not act 
voluntarily, knowingly and with understanding of the court 
proceeding. As argued above, the District Court attempted to 
reverse the duties regarding the record. The rules clearly 
provide that there must be evidence that the Defendant/Appellant 
voluntarily acted with knowledge and understanding, not merely 
that the record be void of evidence to the contrary. 
Had the Appellant made the same record at the June 28, 1988 
hearing, that he made at the June 6, 1989 hearing, both on the 
defendant's voluntary and knowing entry of a plea of guilty, the 
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Court could not have accepted the Appellant/Defendant's plea of 
guilty, but rather would have been compelled to retain his plea 
of not guilty and set a new trial date. Since there is no record 
of any conversation between the Court and the Appellant/Defendant 
for the June 28, 1988, hearing, their conversation during the 
June 6, 1989 hearing must be taken as the only record from which 
to establish the voluntary and knowing nature of the guilty plea. 
That being the only record, the plea should not have been 
entered. 
Nevertheless, because counsel and the prosecutor had 
informed the Court that there would be a plea bargain, and the 
trial date for the matter had already passed, both probably felt 
compelled to dispose of the case as had been previously planned. 
The record of June 28, 1988 does indicate that the Court recessed 
in order to allow the parties to discuss the matter, indicating 
that the case was not ready during the regularly scheduled 
calendar, further supporting AppellantTs contention that he was 
not happy nor content with the proceedings. 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
Taking the only record available from June 28, 1988, and 
June 6, 1989 there is only one conclusion available, that 
Defendant/Appellantfs plea was not properly entered and should 
not have been entered, or at least should have been withdrawn 
upon his motion to do so. Defendant/Appellant seeks relief from 
the District Court's refusal to do so. 
The District Court failed to make the required record at the 
time of the entry of Defendant's plea of guilty. The only 
evidence supporting the Court's action is the Statement of 
Defendant containing statement of regarding the voluntary and 
knowing nature of the entry of the plea. The Court of Appeals 
has directed that such a statement is, by itself, insufficient to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure outlining the acceptance of guilty pleas. The Court 
did not review the statement with the Defendant to learn if the 
contents of the statement were true. 
The Court of Appeals had provided that the Statement of 
Defendant must be reviewed by the District Court and the 
Defendant before a guilty plea is accepted to avoid the very 
situation encountered here. Because the proper record was not 
made in the District Court, and because the proper steps were not 
taken by the District Court in accepting the guilty plea of 
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Defendant/Appellant, and because the District Court refused to 
allow Defendant/Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court 
of Appeals should intervene to allow the withdrawal of the plea 
of guilty. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1989. 
Mark H. Tanner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Mark H. Tanner, do hereby certify that on the day of 
July, 1989, I sent to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, four true 
and correct copies of the above and foregoing brief, by 
depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage fully prepaid. 
Mark H. Tanner 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE A. HEINIGER 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
i Criminal No. 870 
The above-named Defendant appeared on June 6, 1989, together 
with his attorney, MARK H. TANNER, for hearing on Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Defendant's Guilty Plea. The Defendant 
testified, and after hearing the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE of this Court that the 
Defendant's Motion for Order Setting New Arraignment be denied. 
The court finds that the record shows no evidence of the Defend-
ant having been dissatisfied with his attorney at the time the 
plea was entered; that the plea was entered with Defendant and 
defense counsel present; and that the Statement of Defendant was 
signed by the Defendant and certified to by defense counsel, 
waiving Defendant's various constitutional rights and acknowledg-
ing that the Defendant has read, understood and signed the 
Statement. The Court further finds that at the time of sentenc-
ing, the Defendant and defense counsel answered in the negative 
when asked if there was any legal reason to state why sentencing 
should not be carried out at that time. 
The Defendant is remanded back to the custody of the warden 
of the Utah State Prison for the completion of his original 
sentence, with credit for all time served during the pendency of 
the above-referred to motion. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1989, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order by depositing same 
in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Defendant's 
attorney as follows: 
Mark H. Tanner 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1148 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
Secretary 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant, 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. 
COMES NOW, Grfcryz JMJVMQO^ * the Defendant in t h i s case , and hereby 
acknowledges and c e r t i f i e s the fo l lowing: 
I have entered a plea of Gui l ty (No Contest) to the fo l lowing cr ime(s) : 
Crime Degree Punishment (Min/Max) 
A. fo/€*^(toocS4^ ** ^ && A/^/T 
c. 
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading 
Guilty (No Contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and under-
standing of the following facts: 
1 . I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that 
if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost 
to me. 
2. I (have notVh^fe) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my 
right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
because of the following reasons: 
3« If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this Statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings, and the consequences of my plea of Guilty. 
4. If I have not waived ray right to counsel, ray attorney is /J/^f C sr&Jc 
, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this Statement, 
my rights, and the consequences of my Guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my 
attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at 
State expense to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf, but if I 
choose not to do so, I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against 
myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn against me if I do testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only 
plead "Not Guilty" and the matter will be set for trial at which time the State 
of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and 
convicted by a jury or by the judge, that I would have the right to appeal my 
conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the 
Supreme Court of Utah, and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon my plea 
of Guilty and that sentence may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know 
that in addition to any fine, a % surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the 
court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
11 . ' I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine 
for additional amounts, if ray plea is to more than one charge. I also know 
that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded Guilty, ray plea in the 
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading Guilty (No Contest), I am waiv-
ing my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. 
I also know that by entering such plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that 
I have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which 
my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of Guilty (No Contest) is/are not the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and 
provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agree-
ment attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sen-
tencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, 
are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me 
as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion or unlawful influence of any kind have been made 
to induce me to plead Guilty (No Contest), and no promises, except those con-
tained herein and in the attached Plea Agreement, have been made to me. 
16. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, 
and I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete any-
thing contained in this affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because 
all of the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
18. I am LM years of age, I have attended school through /2^^\ grade, 
and I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influ-
ence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea(s) was/were made. I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable 
of understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea(s), and free 
of any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowing-
ly, intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea(s). 
DATED this Qf</day of
 <=^A^U2^ , 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for f^crynJl \\ssuf\l<zy^ , the 
Defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the Statemenx or that I have 
readit to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she 
fully understands the meaning of its contents and is raentallv and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate inves-
tigation, the elements of the crime(s) and factual synopsis of the Defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other repre-
sentations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing affidavit, 
are accurate and true. 
ifttoprtey for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
\&/^ , Defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the 
efendant and "f D  vfind that the declarations, including the elements of the offense 
of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. No improper inducements, 
threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of Defendant 
for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and certifica-
tion, the Court finds the Defendant's plea(s) of Guilty (No Contest) is/are 
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the Defendant's plea(s) 
of Guilty (No Contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted 
and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this _ Jg?**t <* M/tfiZ&Jl™ • 
